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Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of pro￿t
sharing between two rival ￿rms and studied the positive e⁄ects of this strat-
egy on each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t under the assumption that each ￿rm decides uni-
laterally to give away voluntarily a part of its pro￿t to its rival. This article
relaxes partially this assumption by letting only one ￿rm to share its pro￿t
whereas the other ￿rm keeps its entire pro￿t.
Contrary to the previous article, we show that no ￿rm wins by adopting
such an opportunistic behavior. This suggests that pro￿t sharing between
￿rms is a win-win (dominant) strategy if both ￿rms are involved and compete
in prices.
Keywords: Pro￿t sharing, Oligopoly, Deviation, Competition.
JEL Classi￿cation: C72, D21, L13.1 Introduction
In a companion paper (Waddle 2005b), we examined whether and how
sharing pro￿ts may increase the pro￿t of two ￿rms in a duopoly market.
Our companion paper1 focused on such a strategy where both ￿rms uni-
laterally decide to give away a fraction of their pro￿ts to their rivals. The
purpose of this present paper is to relax partially this assumption and to
allow only one ￿rm to cede a part of its pro￿t whereas the other ￿rm keeps
its entire pro￿t and still receives a portion of its rival￿ s pro￿t. In other terms,
we had before a two-side pro￿t-sharing while we focus here on just one-side
pro￿t-sharing2.
Contrary to the previous article, we show that no ￿rm (neither the devi-
ating ￿rm, let alone the loyal ￿rm) wins by adopting such an opportunistic
behavior. This suggests that pro￿t sharing between ￿rms is a win-win (dom-
inant) strategy if both ￿rms are involved and compete in prices.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 centers on the second-stage of the game and shows that there exists an
unique NE in prices. Section 4 then turns to the ￿rst-stage of the game and
demonstrates the existence of an unique SPNE. Section 5 concludes with
suggestions for future research.
2 The model
We consider here a model similar to the one presented in our companion
paper except that we allow only one ￿rm to share its pro￿t whereas the other
￿rm keeps its entire pro￿t and still receives a fraction of its rival￿s pro￿t.
As before, let two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a homogeneous market and suppose
that each ￿rm incurs a cost c per unit of production. The market demand
function is q = D(p) = 1 ￿ p. We assume that ￿rms do not have capacity
constraints and always supply the demand they face. Therefore, the pro￿t





(pi ￿ c)qi if pi < pj
1
2(pi ￿ c)qi if pi = pj
0 otherwise
i = 1;2 (i 6= j)
1We refer to our companion article (Waddle 2005b) for a discussion of the relation
between our work and the literature.
2The terms one-side and two-side pro￿t sharing are inspired by the one-sided, two-
sided or multi-sided markets where strategies such as "tying" is often used in at least one
platform.
1where qi is the quantity demanded faced by ￿rm i.
Let ￿1 denote the part of the pro￿t that ￿rm 1 (the loyal ￿rm) wants
to share with ￿rm 2 (the deviating ￿rm) We suppose that ￿1 2 ]0;1[.
Consequently, we can write the new pro￿t functions P1(p1(￿1);p2(￿1)) and
P2(p1(￿1);p2(￿1)) (hereafter P1 and P2 ) of each ￿rm as:
P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1(p1(￿1);p2(￿1))
Pi = ￿2(p1(￿1);p2(￿1)) + ￿1￿1(p1(￿1);p2(￿1))
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rm 1 chooses ￿1. In the second stage of the game,
￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxa1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1
Max P2 = ￿2 + ￿1￿1
In the second stage of game, for p1 and p2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxp1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1
Maxp2 P2 = ￿2 + ￿1￿1
3 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximize their pro￿ts.
Proposition 1 Any prices (p1, p2) such that c < p1 = p2 ￿ pm cannot be
NE in the second stage of the game
2Proof. (p1, p2) such that c < p1 = p2 ￿ pm are not NE if and only if at
least one ￿rm wants to deviate from those prices by ￿xing a price p0
i above
or below. In fact:
c ￿ p1 = p2 = p ￿ pm ) ￿1 = ￿2 > 0
￿1 = 1
2 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) = 1
2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
￿2 = 1
2 (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2) = 1
2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿1) 1
2 (p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P1 = 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿1)(p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
P2 = 1
2 (1 + ￿1)(p ￿ c)(1 ￿ p)
Since ￿rms￿strategies are di⁄erent, we have to study separately the de-
viation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) > 0 and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c)
If p1 ￿ pm(monopolistic price), then p1 = p ￿ ".
For " very small3, P 0
1 ’ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ p)(p ￿ c) > P1
P 0
1 > P1 ) Firm 1 would deviate. In that case, it is useless to check
whether or not ￿rm 2 will deviate. In fact, the deviation of one ￿rm is
enough to prove the non-equilibrium.
Conclusion: (p1, p2) such that c < p1 = p2 ￿ pm cannot be NE in the
second-stage of the game.
Proposition 2 Any prices (pi, pj) such that c < pi = pm < pj cannot be
NE in the second stage of the game
3There is no reason for not to suppose that " is very small. For instance, ￿rms need to
decrease or increase just slightly to get or to lose the entire market.
3Proof. (p1, p2) s. t. c < p2 = pm < p1 (c < p1 = pm < p2) constitute a
NE if and only if no ￿rm has interest to deviate from those prices by ￿xing
a price p0
i above or below.
A:￿ c < p2 = pm < p1 ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2) > 0
P1 = 0
P2 = ￿2 = (p2 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p2)
Since prices p1 and p2 are di⁄erent, we have to study separately the
deviation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) > P1 = 0
P 0
1 > P1 )Firm 1 would deviate and therefore c < p2 = pm < p1 cannot
be a NE.
B:￿ c < p1 = pm < p2 ) ￿1 = (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1) and ￿2 = 0
P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)(p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
P2 = ￿1￿1 = ￿1 (p1 ￿ c)(1 ￿ p1)
Since prices p1 and p2 are di⁄erent, we have to study separately the
deviation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:
i) p2 = p1 ￿ " (" > 0) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) and ￿1 = 0
P 0
2 = ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) = (1 ￿ p1 + ")(p1 ￿ c ￿ ")
For " very small, P 0
2 ’ (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) > P2
P 0
2 > P2 )Firm 2 would deviate and therefore c < p1 = pm < p2 cannot
be a NE.
Conclusion: Any prices (pi, pj) such that c ￿ pi = pm < pj cannot be a
NE in the second-stage of the game.
Proposition 3 Any prices (p1, p2) such that p1 = p2 = c is NE in the second
stage of the game
4Proof. (p1, p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c is NE if and only if no ￿rm has interest
to deviate from those prices to ￿x a price p0
i above or below.
p2 = p2 = c ) ￿1 = 0 and ￿2 = 0
P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 = 0
P2 = ￿2 + ￿1￿1 = 0
Since ￿rms￿strategies are di⁄erent, we have to study separately the de-
viation for both ￿rms. Let us check ￿rst for ￿rm 1. Suppose that:
i) p1 = p2 ￿ " (p1 < p2 and p1 < c) ) ￿1 < 0 and ￿2 = 0
P 0
1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 < 0
) P 0
1 < P1 = 0 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p2
ii) p1 = p2 + " (p1 > p2 = c) () ￿2 = (1 ￿ p2)(p2 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿1 = 0
(￿rm 1 does not produce)
P 00
1 = 0 = P1 )Firm 1 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p2
Let us check now for ￿rm 2. Suppose that:
i) p2 = p1 ￿ " (p1 < p2 and p1 < c) ) ￿2 < 0 and ￿1 = 0
P 0
2 = ￿1￿1 = 0
) P 0
2 = P2 = 0 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price below p1
ii) p2 = p1 + " (p1 > p2 = c) () ￿1 = (1 ￿ p1)(p1 ￿ c) = 0 and ￿2 = 0
(￿rm 2 does not produce)
P 00
2 = 0 = P2 )Firm 2 has no interest by ￿xing a price above p1
Conclusion: 8 ￿1 2 ]0;1[, any prices (p1, p2) s.t. p1 = p2 = c constitute
a NE in the second-stage of the game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NE being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNEa
54 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing
their pro￿t to share with their rival.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the
previous section and have found the NEa in prices summarized below:




Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNEa in ￿1.
Proposition 4 The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1)), p2 (￿1) s.t.:
i) ￿1 2 ]0;1[
ii) p￿
1 = p￿
2 = c if 0 < ￿1 < 1
are SPNEa of the game
Proof. The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1)), p2 (￿1) s.t. i) and ii) are satis￿ed,
are SPNEa if and only if no ￿rm has interest to deviate from those prices by
choosing a ￿0
i above or below.
Let us check for ￿rm 1. For instance, suppose that:
i) ￿0
1 < ￿1 ) 0 < ￿0
1 < 1 )
P 0
1 = 0 = P1 ) Firm 1 does not deviate.
ii) ￿0
1 > ￿1 ) 0 < ￿0
1 < 1 )
P 00
1 = 0 = P1 ) Firm 1 does not deviate.
Conclusion: The strategies (￿1;p1 (￿1)), p2 (￿1) s.t. i) and ii) are satis-
￿ed, are SPNEa.
65 Conclusion
This paper has shown how (one-side) pro￿t sharing between two ￿rms in a
homogeneous market may be deceitful. After all, it shed light on that such an
opportunistic behavior is not at all pro￿table neither to the deviating ￿rm,
nor to the loyal one. It has thus suggested that our theory of (two-side) pro￿t
sharing between ￿rms is a win-win (dominant) strategy if ￿rms compete in
prices.
There are many dimensions along which this simple model can be en-
riched. For instance, a natural one is the extension of our model to the
Cournot, Stackelberg models and the like. Pro￿t Sharing Between Firms: A
Lose-Lose Strategy (Waddle 2005e) focuses on this issue.
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